FAQ What about benchmarks? Quality of implementation matters — no argument there — and you should do your due diligence. That said, you need to test on your own hardware and with realistic traffic patterns to get an accurate picture of what works best for your specific workload.
The vulnerability CVE allows for a maliciously crafted Flash object to execute code on victim computers, which enables an attacker to execute a range of payloads and actions.
This blog will outline details on various aspects of the discovered attack, the potential targeting of Qatar, and suggestions for defenses against similar attack chains.
It is our goal that by sharing this, defensive teams will be informed about recently discovered threat activity and more broadly understand the type of indicators that can assist in identification of similar attack vectors. Many thanks to the team for working with us. Attack Overview The exploit uses a Microsoft Office document to download and execute an Adobe Flash exploit to victim computers.
The exploitation process, detailed in Figure 1, begins by downloading and Symmetric encryption is outdated a a remote Shockwave Flash SWF file. Appropriate use of asymmetric cryptography, like RSA, evades traditional defenses such as replay-based network security devices and prevents a post-mortem network packet capture analysis.
The second SWF stage, after exploiting the system and achieving code execution, uses the same cryptosystem to download and execute shellcode to further enable the threat actor to control the victim machine.
Typically, the final payload consists of shellcode that provides backdoor functionality to the system or stages additional tools. ICEBRG attempted to retrieve the final payload during analysis but was unable to due to several possible reasons.
Walkthrough of exploitation process Remote Flash Inclusion The attack loads Adobe Flash Player from within Microsoft Office, which is a popular approach to Flash exploitation since Flash is disabled in many browsers. Attackers typically embed a Flash file within a document, which may contain the entire exploit, or may stage the attack to download exploits and payloads more selectively e.
This leaves, at a minimum, a small Flash loader that defenders can flag for detection and analysts can fingerprint for tracking. Contrary to typical tactics, this attack uses a lesser-known feature that remotely includes the Flash content instead of directly embedding it within the document Figure 2.
This is purely an example of how the initial object can be included. Remote loading of the embedded Flash object has multiple significant advantages: The document by itself does not contain any malicious code.
Statically, the best one can do is detect the presence of remotely included Flash content.
Further, the attacker may selectively serve the next stage based upon the requesting IP address or HTTP headers indicating a specific targeted environment. Once access is established, the attacker may decommission their server and subsequent analysis of the attack must rely on leftover forensic artifacts.
Because the attacker can selectively serve exploits to the victim, they can limit the attack to intended victims. The attacker can limit access to specific IP addresses, either through whitelisting networks of target companies or individuals via a regional ISP, or blacklisting cloud infrastructure and security companies.
The ordering, inclusion, or absence of HTTP headers in general may also discriminate between security products, real victims, and intended victims.
Even with a minimal static footprint, upon document load, the remote Flash object will be retrieved and executed within the context of Microsoft Office. The custom cryptosystem leverages a public Action Script library for low level operations.
Generic network retrieval and decrypt routine Data transmission is initiated by the client, whereby the client HTTP POSTs a randomly generated RSA modulus n and the exponent 0x, and the server responds with the following structure: Encrypted AES key length L 0x4: AES encrypted data payload Figure 4: Structure of encrypted data To decrypt the data payload, the client decrypts the encrypted AES key using its randomly generated private key, then decrypts the data payload with the decrypted AES key.
The extra layer of public key cryptography, with a randomly generated key, is crucial here. By using it, one must either recover the randomly generated key or crack the RSA encryption to analyze subsequent layers of the attack.
If implemented correctly, this renders packet capture in forensic analysis and automated security products ineffective.
Furthermore, the decrypted data payloads will only reside in memory, challenging traditional disk forensics and non-volatile artifact analysis. Consequently, offline analysis is possible, although more laborious than online analysis, whereby the analyst may either instrument a mock victim or create a man-in-the-middle service, then attempt to be exploited by the attacker.
The combination of a remotely included Flash exploit and asymmetric cryptography are particularly powerful counters against postmortem analysis.
In that scenario, responders may look to network packet captures to recreate the attack. Use of Zero-Day Exploit After decryption, the exploit payload is loaded and triggered to allow for follow-on code execution.
Although the document is a Microsoft Office document, the code is executing within an Adobe Flash container. You might ask, why conduct Flash exploitation within Microsoft Office?
Over the past several years, many browsers have hardened their attack surface in regard to external plugins and applications, including Adobe Flash.The process of establishing and communicating over an encrypted channel introduces additional computational costs.
First, there is the asymmetric (public key) encryption . Symmetric encryption is a two-way algorithm because the mathematical procedure is turned back when decrypting the message along with using the same private key.
Symmetric encryption is also referred to as private-key encryption and secure-key encryption. In cryptography, RC4 (Rivest Cipher 4 also known as ARC4 or ARCFOUR meaning Alleged RC4, see below) is a stream vetconnexx.com remarkable for its simplicity and speed in software, multiple vulnerabilities have been discovered in RC4, rendering it insecure.
It is especially vulnerable when the beginning of the output keystream is not discarded, or when nonrandom or related keys are used.
In the last few weeks, I’ve had several interesting conversations concerning email encryption. I’m also trying to develop some concept of what areas Thunderbird should .
Symmetric encryption is a form of computerized cryptography using a singular encryption key to guise an electronic message. Its data conversion uses a mathematical algorithm along with a secret key, which results in the inability to make sense out of a message.
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